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Gerald B. Stanford* Canadian Perspectives on
the Future Enforcement of the
Exclusive Economic Zone: A
Paper in Diplomacy and the
Law of the Sea
I. Introduction
Canada's declaration of a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) in the forefront of a rush by coastal states to stake their claims
to the resources of the seas and the extension of coastal state
jurisdiction was considered by some to be pre-empting the outcome
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
(UNCLOS III). It is certainly contrary to the call of Ambassador
Arvid Pardo in 1967 before the General Assembly of the United
Nations, seeking the reservation of the sea-bed and its resources
beyond the recognized boundaries of state jurisdiction as "the
common heritage of mankind". However, Canada's claims and
extension of jurisdiction are unique in the method of implementa-
tion and as a study for modalities of enforcement of the Exclusive
Economic Zone. Examination of Canada's unilateral actions shows
that they are still in keeping with her policies in the development of
a Law of the Sea Treaty in UNCLOS III, but implemented through
effective diplomacy as a prelude to unilateral action and an
alternative to possible enforcement conflicts. The outcome of a
treaty being still conjectural, it is the purpose of this paper to
examine Canada's successes and problems in enforcement of the
Exclusive Economic Zone as a model for the future of the EEZ in
international law in the event of failure of UNCLOS III to develop a
final Treaty. 1 From the Canadian approach lessons and conclusions
can be drawn showing a smoother path to the resolution of problems
which would beset the r6gime of the EEZ were it left to a world
community divided by its conflicts and pursued by extremes of
unilateral action. Final agreement on all the issues of the law of the
sea may not be essential for further evolution of the law through
*G. B. Stanford, LL.B. Dalhousie, 1978
1. Even if a Treaty is evolved, the possibility of unilateralism will remain. See
Robert W. Smith and Robert D. Hodgson, Unilateralism, The Wave of the Future
(Proceedings of the 10th Annual Conference, Law of the Sea Institute, University
of Rhode Island, 1976) at 137
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treaties and custom, the general movement of reform in UNCLOS
III and international bodies such as IMCO, and the further unilateral
developments of states. Enforcement is not the whole issue in the
EEZ, especially in view of the benefits which can be shown for
other nations besides the coastal state through conservation and
management. Equity plays a large part in the acceptance of the
regime, which can be met to a great degree by conservation and
management of resources to provide a greater surplus for sharing on
the one hand, and benefits to land-locked or disadvantaged
countries on the other.
Canada's moves in extending jurisdiction over the EEZ during
1977 have been largely interim measures. Major problems remain to
be resolved, but the success of the first year is reflected in the
acceptance of Canadian regulations, the lack of conflict or
violations, and the developments in resolution of problems of
boundary settlement and jurisdiction. Canada's success shows that
even without a Treaty as a direct result of UNCLOS III, the doctrine
of the EEZ can be implemented unilaterally, bringing many of the
benefits sought in a new maritime world order.
II. Canadian Policy in Law of the Sea
Canada in UNCLOS III
Canada's leading role in UNCLOS III, combatting over-
exploitation of the resources of the sea and the increasing danger to
the marine environment through pollution, has pursued policies
supporting the revision of the law of the sea by treaty but explicitly
coastal, taking a functional approach for uniform definitions of
limits and maintaining a varying degree of coastal state authority. 2
In her support of the principle of custodianship, with the rights of
the coastal state being balanced with responsibility for the
protection and management of the resources and uses of the sea,
Canada advocated the principle of the EEZ as the keystone of
overall accommodation in the law of the sea. 3 Her policies are based
on a 12 mile territorial sea and a 200 mile EEZ, but extending the
2. For a review of the development of Canadian policy in the law of the sea, see B.
Johnson and M. W. Zacher, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea
(Vancouver: Univ. of British Columbia Press, 1977)
3. Claude C. Emanuelli, Canadian Approach to the Third Law of the Sea
Conference (1975-76), XXIV U.N.B.L.J. 3 at 6, quoting J. Alan Beesley, Leader
of the Canadian Delegation to UNCLOS III, in the First Committee 30 November
1972.
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EEZ to the Continental Margin where that is beyond the 200 mile
limit. Canada's stand on the marine environment was established in
the 1971 Intergovernmental Working Group on Marine Pollution, in
which the draft Canadian texts proposed the policy of primary
though not exclusive responsibility for coastal area environmental
protection. This was also the rationale for unilateral legislation,
4
taken for extension of territorial jurisdiction, 5 management of
fisheries,6 and for protection of the marine environment in coastal
waters 7 and areas of special vulnerability. 8
Because of the ineffectiveness of flag-state jurisdiction over
shipping and the weakness of international anti-pollution measures
Canada would also preclude flag-state jurisdiction over environmen-
tal matters in the EEZ, and has been successful in the re-definition
of innocent passage. There is provision against passage which could
present a danger to the environment of the coastal state, 9 and a
provision against willful pollution but which, as major pollution
accidents are hardly willful, is still not wide enough to bar such
passage as may threaten the environment of the coastal state. 10
While there has not been full acceptance of her principles Canada
continues her stand in respect to her unilateral action relying on
4. D. M. Johnston, International Environmental Law: Recent Developments and
Canadian Contributions in MacDonald, Morris & Johnston, eds., Canadian
Perspectives on International Law and Organization (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto
Press, 1974) at 355
5. An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st
Supp.), c. 45
6. (i) Canada Gazette, Pt II, January 1, 1977, SOR/77-62; Territorial Sea and
Fishing Zones Act, PC 1977-1 January 1, 1977 and SOR/77-50; Foreign
Vessel Fishing Regulations, PC 1976-3178, December 23, 1976.
(ii) Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-21, as amended by
S.C. 1969-70 (lst Supp.), c. 8.
(iii) The Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14 as amended by S.C. 1970 (1st
Supp.), c. 17
7. The Canada Shipping Act, S.C. 1971, c. 27
8. Arctic Waters Pollution PreventionAct, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 2
9. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, A/CONF. 62/WPIO, July 15, 1977 at
Article 19
10. The Canadian draft text to the 1971 Intergovernmental Working Group on
Marine Pollution stated:
No state has the right to pollute the marine environment .... A state may
exercise special authority in areas of the sea adjacent to the territorial waters
where functional controls of a continuing nature are necessary for the effective
prevention of pollution which could cause damage or injury to the land or the
marine environment under its exclusive or sovereign authority.
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extrapolation of the principle of the Trail Smelter case."
Meanwhile the increasing number of tanker casualties and the scope
of pollution involved are bringing home to other nations the
increasing urgency of the problem, further emphasized by the
grounding of the super-tanker "Amoco Cadiz". 12
While supporting the principle of the "common heritage of
mankind", beyond the EEZ, Canada does not quite agree with the
means of control of those resources and views the International
Sea-bed Authority as a promotional rather than regulatory body.
Compromise appears possible on this, subject to coastal control
over the continental margin, with a r6gime for fisheries
management and protection of the environment. 13 Meanwhile the
regulating function of the coastal state is seen as the key factor in
safe management and operation of shipping for the prevention of
pollution, 14 with absolute liability on the part of the shipowner and
the cargo owner.1 5 Canada has successfully demonstrated what is
necessary, while events give further justification, and states faced
with direct evidence on their own coasts are moving towards
unilateral regulations 16 and are also seeking more effective
measures for tanker safety through IMCO. 17
Canadian Unilateral Actions
While declaring a 12 mile territorial sea, Canadian legislation has
asserted jurisdiction for preservation of the environment and
1I. United States v. Canada (1944), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905. Under international
law no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as
to cause injury in or to the territory of another.
12. [1977] 3 LMCLQ 434. In 1976, 20 tankers or 1,172,000 total DWT were total
losses; while in January and February 1977 alone, four tankers broke in two and
sank, spilling 162,000 tons of oil. The grounding of the super-tankerAmoco Cadiz
on the Brittany coast further emphasized the problem.
13. See G. W. Alexandrowicz, Canadian Approaches to the Seabed Regime in
Canadian Perspectives on International Law and Organization, supra, note 4 at
410
14. L. H. T. Legault, Maritime Claims in Canadian Perspectives, supra, note 4 at
377
15. (i) Canada Shipping Act, S.C. 1971, c.27, s.734 .
(ii) Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c.2,
s.6
16. [1977] 3 LMCLQ 442: The U.S. Federal Administration is moving, through
Congress, to establish a pollution damage fund, new regulations are proposed to
govern tankers entering U.S. ports, including construction, safety equipment and
crew training.
17. [1974]4 LMCLQ 609
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management of resources and put this into effect through
regulations. Under the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Regula-
tions the Arctic waters north of 600 North are divided into 16 control
zones on the basis of geography and environmental hazards, while
ships are categorized under 10 Arctic classes depending on their
suitability for Arctic operations. Clearance must be obtained to
operate north of 600 North and ships are limited by their
classification for given zones in specified times of the year. Despite
initial opposition to such measures, the services offered in return
have made compliance an advantage to shipping. These range from
meteorological and ice information and routing advice to ice
navigation assistance, and icebreaker service, providing safety for
the ships as well for the environment.
South of 60' North, the pollution prevention regulations 18 extend
to the territorial sea and fisheries zones as declared in 1970,19 thus
limited to the territorial sea and those fisheries zones that were
enclosed by fisheries closure lines. 20 The Canada Shipping Act
regulations are not as extensive as the Arctic Waters regulations and
it remains to be seen whether the jurisdiction will be extended
further. The Canadian declaration of the EEZ is really over a 200
mile Exclusive Fisheries Zone, claiming jurisdiction for conserva-
tion and management of fisheries. This has not changed the status of
control over the seabed and its resources which continues under the
1958 Geneva Convention to extend to the continental margin "to a
depth of 200 metres or such depth as permits exploitation". 21 It has,
however, introduced the concept of managerial jurisdiction with the
principle of the preferential rights of the coastal state. Meanwhile,
as fish do not observe an arbitrary 200 mile limit, Canada has
continued negotiations for a new regional fish-management scheme
beyond the EEZ. This "son of ICNAF" or Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization (NAFO) will provide for management of
fish stocks in the convention area outside the EEZ in a manner
consistent with the Canadian regime within the EEZ, treating the
fish stocks of the EEZ and the outer fisheries areas as a whole. The
agreement awaits ratification by the countries concerned, but
18. Under Canada Shipping Act, S.C. 1971, c.27, Part XX
19. An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1 st
Supp.), c.45
20. E.g., Gulf of St. Lawrence, Bay of Fundy, Hecate Strait, Dixon Entrance.
21. 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, 29 April 1958, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF 13/30, Article I
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meanwhile Canadian ICNAF fisheries patrols continue in the areas
beyond the EEZ.
Differences in Approach to the EEZ
Previous claims, such as the earlier Latin-American 200 mile
claims, were maintained with strong enforcement in the face of
opposition by states and users who refused to recognize such
claims. Consequently U.S. tuna fishermen ended up in South
American courts with some frequency. Iceland went through three
"Cod Wars" and years of acrimonious diplomatic conflict to expel
foreign fishermen, particularly British fishing vessels, from
Icelandic waters to establish exclusive ownership of fisheries within
the 200 mile limit. Canada's declaration came when the concept of a
200 mile limit had gained greater acceptability in international
diplomacy and become essential for national interests. In Europe the
European Economic Community (EEC) and Britain also declared
200 mile limits. While the EEC limit is a common one in which the
fisheries of the entire area are open to all members, there is in
addition to old jealousies of fishing interests, the need for
re-location of fishing efforts. Consequently Britain is seeking to
claim her own EEZ exclusively for fisheries as well as the sea-bed,
under the traditional approach and the 1958 Convention, 22 to the
median lines. 23 Norway has established her fishery based on the 200
mile limit, but the Soviet Union having decreased quotas for West
European fishing vessels in the Barents Sea to minimal quantities is
now excluded from North Sea areas. The United States has declared
its own 200 mile limit and offenders are detained for long periods
with heavy fines. The Argentine, in October 1977, arrested seven
Soviet fishing vessels during an incident in which three Argentinian
officers were lost overboard. Against such arbitrary, costly and
rigorous enforcement, the Canadian approach has been low key,
smooth and yet effective.
In the Canadian approach conservation and regulation by
management to provide benefits to all participants has been the key.
Without conservation and management it was clear that fish stocks
would not survive, thus in preparation for implementation of a 200
mile limit Canada negotiated a series of 16 bilateral treaties with
states having interests in the fisheries areas to be enclosed. The
22. Id.
23. North Sea Continental Shelf cases, [1969] I.C.J.R. 47
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treaties call for co-operation in management of the fisheries, in
conservation and in research. Under them foreign fishing vessels
may be licensed by Canada to fish stocks surplus to Canadian
requirements, subject to Canadian laws, regulations and quotas.
The treaties also provide for the Canadian primary interest in the
anadromous species, and for international management beyond 200
miles. 24 Under the treaties Canada is authorized to determine the
total allowable catch, to measure and allocate the catch for
Canadian vessels and, from the surplus, allocate quotas to foreign
vessels under licence. Canada is given full discretion in the
licensing of all vessels, allocating the areas and times for which the
licences are valid. The quotas are based on figures established by
the Canadian Department of the Environment (Fisheries) and, even
though the foreign countries have a smaller proportion of the total
allowable catch, the need for management and conservation and the
benefits of rehabilitation of the depleted stocks are recognized by
them. The foreign fishing fleets have thus become voluntary
participants in the establishment and operation of the Canadian
regime which while safeguarding Canada's primary interest will be
of benefit to all.
The DOE (Fisheries) organization is based on regional
management with overall control by the Minister in Ottawa. The
importance of close liaison has been recognized by several distant
fishing fleet countries which have sent accredited representatives for
full-time liaison. These include the Soviet Union, Poland and Cuba.
The importance attached to effective liaison and participation in the
Canadian fisheries by the U.S.S.R. is reflected in the rank of their
representative, Alexei Volkov, a Deputy Minister, resident in
Halifax on a fulltime basis to provide a direct link through Moscow
with both his government and the Soviet fishing fleet. Licensed
vessels are required to report to the regional office of DOE
(Fisheries) before entering the area, to report their catch on a weekly
basis and to report again three days before departure. Aerial
surveillance and periodic inspection verify compliance with
licensing, area, gear and quota regulations. Breaches of regulations
result in prosecution as well as confiscation of gear and catch and
24. E.g., Agreement between Canada and the U.S.S.R. on their Mutual Fisheries
Relations, entered into at Moscow on May 19, 1976, and in force as of that date.
Similar treaties were entered into with Britain, Cameroun, Cuba, Denmark,
France, G.D.R., F.R.G., Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain
and U.S.A.
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fines; but compared with U.S. penalties, Canadian fines have been
moderate25
Environmental protection for the off-shore areas, except for the
Arctic waters, has continued in accordance with the international
convention, 2 6 under which sea areas up to 100 miles off-shore from
the Canadian coasts are prohibited oil discharge zones. Enforce-
ment, however, remains basically a flag-state responsibility,
although Canada includes surveillance and detection of pollution
and violations as a high priority of the coastal state. The emphasis,
under the Canada Shipping Act has been on the safe and adequate
fitment of ships, and in vessel traffic management. The Eastern
Canada Traffic System (ECAREG CANADA)2 7 is presently a
voluntary system, but likely to become compulsory in 1978. Ships
bound for Canadian ports are required to report to the regional MOT
centre 24 hours before arrival. 80% of ships using the Canadian
ports comply with the ECAREG regulations, while for the
remainder reporting is completed through the pilotage authorities.
The ECAREG reports require specific information, including a brief
description of the cargo, especially pollutants or dangerous goods
carried; defects in hull, machinery, navigation and communications
equipment, and the date of expiry of the Non-Canadian Ship's
Compliance Certificate if issued. Further calling-in points and
additional reports are specified for entry, and for departure
clearances. The emphasis is on the safety of ships using Canadian
ports. Ships which do not comply are subject to inspection and may
be diverted or held in port for rectification of defects or deficiencies.
Ministry of Transport officials are presently satisfied with the
effectiveness of the system in reducing and, hopefully, eliminating
hazards of the type of ship looking for a convenient location for a
disaster to happen. Thus as regards extension of jurisdiction further
into the EEZ, Canada is prepared to await the outcome of UNCLOS
III while remaining ready to take further unilateral action, as
demonstrated in the Arctic, for areas requiring special
consideration. 28
Some authorities hold that an extension of jurisdiction to provide
any more effective system of safety standards would be very
25. DOE (Fisheries) interviews
26. 1954 International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
27. Canadian Notice to Mariners, Nos. 25, 26/77 (Annual Edition) and No.
561/77
28. M.O.T. interviews
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difficult to enforce, and that as the hazards are on-shore rather than
off-shore the present system is adequate. Further, they hold that if a
wider degree of supervision and control over ships was considered
necessary off-shore, the extension of jurisdiction would not be
feasible due to the vastness of the area and the effort required. It is
debatable whether the present jurisdiction is sufficient, as for
instance in consideration of jurisdiction over casualties at sea caused
by accidents onboard, or by collision or grounding on off-shore
rocks and shallows beyond the 12 mile limit. Some ships even if not
making for a Canadian port may pose a hazard, whether they stay at
sea or are diverted. Also the increasing number of VLCC tankers
and LNG carriers making for terminals in or through Canadian
waters raises the question of the necessity for extension of
jurisdiction and vessel traffic management.
29
III. Canadian Approaches in Enforcement
Surveillance and Enforcement of Fisheries
DOE (Fisheries) surveillance and enforcement capability has been
greatly increased, with new facilities, new patrol vessels, 30 and
more fisheries inspectors. Additional crews permit double-crewing
of patrol vessels for optimum use. DOE resources, however, remain
insufficient for the surveillance and enforcement effort necessary.
The department therefore relies on government inter-department
co-ordination and co-operation, under which all the aerial
surveillance and 31% of the ship surveillance is provided by the
Department of National Defence (Maritime Command), while
another 13% of ship surveillance is provided by the Ministry of
Transport (Canadian Coast Guard). Surveillance costs increased
dramatically from $51/2 million in 1976 to $12 million in 1977, plus
the capital costs of three new fisheries patrol vessels. 31 Naval ship
allocation is approximately one destroyer on task full time
throughout the year with fisheries inspectors embarked. For the
period January 1 to December 31, 1977, air patrols totalled 3270
hours on the east coast, while 746 boardings were made at sea and
29. Id.
30. See D. W. Middlemiss, "Canadian Maritime Enforcement Policies", supra,
note I at 311
31. C. G. S. Cape Roger, a fisheries patrol and research vessel, cost $12,000,000
and the C.G.S. Cape Harrison, a fisheries patrol vessel for the Newfoundland
region cost $3,000,000. C.G.S. Louisbourg is a similar vessel for the Maritimes
(Nova Scotia) region.
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292 in port.3 2 Additional surveillance is provided by Maritime
Command, by double tasking units as operations permit in
conjunction with operational or training missions in the EEZ or on
passage to or from other operational areas.
Joint departmental surveillance ensures the whole EEZ is
surveyed once a week and active fishing areas are covered three or
four times per week, or more often if special monitoring of
particular areas is required, This monitors the identity, position and
activities of fishing vessels within the EEZ and ensures the reporting
of unlicensed vessels or vessels fishing outside their allocated area.
Ship surveillance and inspection off Nova Scotia and on the
Newfoundland Banks is "good", but is admitted to be poor in the
remote areas of the Labrador Sea. The efforts on the Pacific coast
are comparable, though while the fishing areas do not extend so far
off-shore from Vancouver Island as they do off Newfoundland, the
area is long in relation to the bases and facilities available.
Inter-departmental co-ordination and co-operation is good.
Operations Co-ordination Centres are established in the Maritime
Headquarters at Halifax, N.S. and Esquimalt, B.C., so that in
"emergency" or other times requiring joint operations, the
operations are integrated and controlled through the Maritime
Commander's headquarters. 3 3 The Operations Co-ordination
Centres do not obviate the need for independent MOT and DOE
operations centres for their particular needs and day to day
operations. Thus, MOT maintains the ECAREG Operations Centre
at Dartmouth, N.S., and DOE (Fisheries) has operations centres at
Halifax and St. John's, Nfld. for the east coast and at Vancouver,
B.C. for the Pacific coast. The Fisheries Operations Centres
maintain a tote and computer record of all fishing vessels in the EEZ
and provide a direct link to DOE (Fisheries) Ottawa. Thus, when a
possible violation is spotted by a patrolling aircraft or a ship, it can
be reported directly to the Regional Director of Fisheries by voice
radio. Action in respect to a serious violation is referred directly to
Ottawa by the Regional Director's "hot-line", where a report
32. DND (Maritime Command) and DOE (Fisheries) reports
33. E.g., Following a major oil spill on land in a Labrador coastal community,
personnel and equipment were flown in by Maritime Command aircraft, on-site
control was despatched by a naval Captain from Maritime Command Headquarters,
Halifax, while containment and cleanup of the spill involved personnel from the
Canadian Armed Forces, Ministry of Transport and Department of the
Environment, as well as local personnel. Inter-departmental co-ordination was
effected through the Operations Co-ordination Centre, Halifax.
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respecting a foreign vessel is also referred to the Department of
External Affairs. Concurrently if the incident involves a naval ship
or aircraft, the incident is reported to Maritime Command
Headquarters with a direct telephone "patch" to the duty senior
officer. National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, is alerted to be
prepared for consultation or request by DOE (Fisheries) who, after
consultation with Department of External Affairs, will probably
request Department of National Defence to arrest the offending
vessel. In the meantime the duty destroyer or a destroyer at sea will
already have been alerted and be heading for the location, to make
the arrest with minimal delay as soon as authorized.
While the system works well, this does not overcome the
difficulties of covering large areas and long coastlines in difficult
weather conditions. Bad weather is a major factor which may cause
an air patrol to be aborted or rendered ineffective, and prevent
boardings, although Fisheries Inspectors and the naval crews have
strong stomachs and versatile and seaworthy boats for boarding in
all but the worst conditions. However, limitations of the units
themselves also limit the extent of coverage that can be given in any
one mission; thus, a "Tracker" aircraft can fly out for one hour in
transit, cover an 80 mile radius patrol area in four hours and return
to base for a total 6 hour mission. If there are a large number of
vessels to be identified or visibility is poor, the extent of coverage
may be much more limited. However, mission coverage is often
extended by transiting via patrol to bases in Newfoundland,
Labrador or Baffin Island, operating out of base for a further
mission and then returning via patrol to home base.
34
Environmental Protection and Pollution Control
While Canadian jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea for pollution
control has only been extended over the Arctic Waters north of 600
North, Canadian interest in the off-shore areas in respect to
pollution extends at least to the 100 mile limits of the "prohibited
zones" prescribed under the 1954 Convention. 35 The surveillance
provided by government departments for fisheries protection also
provides for detection of pollution offences. Enforcement,
however, is dependent on detection requiring daylight and good
weather. Pollution is not detectable in darkness without infra-red
34. Discussions with Maritime Command staff and aircrew
35. Supra, note 26
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detectors, and is difficult to detect in bad weather. Added to this are
the evidentiary problems in prosecution. Under optimum circums-
tances with the presence of a patrol ship, photographic evidence and
pollutant samples can be obtained. In September 1963 a ship
causing pollution in the Strait of Georgia off Vancouver, B.C. was
spotted by an RCAF aircraft which took aerial photographs while an
Air-Sea Rescue Boat obtained oil samples, leading to conviction in
the Provincial Court. This was the first case in Canada in which it
was possible to match oil taken from the sea with samples from the
offending ship's bilges following arrest on the aircraft's report.
However, in September 1970, in the case of The s.s. "Hunting-
don", after she had been sighted by a Maritime Command "Argus"
long range patrol aircraft trailing an oil slick 2 miles long, 22
photographs were taken and the observations of 12 aircraft crew
members recorded. As the ship was beyond Canadian jurisdiction
the case and recorded evidence were referred to Britain for action in
the English courts. British government officials interviewed the
aircraft crew members in Halifax in May 1971 and the case was
finally tried in the English Central Criminal Court in October 1972,
resulting in the conviction of the Master and the Owners after a
lengthy process. However, the problems of light and weather
conditions prevail regardless of jurisdiction. The current levels of
surveillance provide a reasonable anti-pollution coverage, and a
more direct jurisdiction over shipping, requiring a greater effort for
inspection and enforcement, might be at a disproportionately
increased cost.
The government policy of diplomatic rather than aggressive
unilateral action in respect to enforcement and prosecution of
pollution offences beyond the territorial sea thus depends on flag
state prosecution. However, even within the territorial sea,
Canada's prosecution of pollution offences has been described
as modest in nature and in penalties. 36 Indeed, in relation to the
costs of ship operation the small fines often levied in the small
number of successful prosecutions have been related to "parking
tickets". This is not encouraging, but neither is the pollution that
originates from the land, including refineries and power stations,
which are also indicative of a continuing lack of appreciation of the
problem and its effects. Small spills do not make headlines, neither
do surreptitious bilge discharges, but tanker owners perhaps have
36. Middlemiss, supra, note I at 334
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some grounds for maintaining that the more spectacular spills from
tanker accidents account for only a small proportion of the total
ocean pollution. 37 However, these measures provide some
deterrence and are reasonable considering that 100% anti-pollution
surveillance is impossible, weather conditions can be difficult and
evidence hard to obtain.
Employment of the Armed Forces in Enforcement
The question may be asked: "Why use expensive sophisticated
naval vessels for fisheries protection duties?" It is not limited to the
Canadian Forces but has been asked in the armed forces of many of
the Western democracies. The traditional roles of sea-power in
peacetime have been limited by the changing world order and the
retreat of empires, while national concerns have increased over their
local sea areas and resources. At the same time the pressures of
technical advances and inflated costs have forced maritime states
not only to question their naval functions, but to demand greater
cost effectiveness in the employment and performance of their
armed forces. The raison d'Etre of navies still arises out of maritime
defence and the national requirements for use of the seas for
transportation, and military diplomacy ranging from support of
policies and alliances in national defence to the presence or use of
force. Additionally there is the increasing concern for protection
and control of resources in or under the sea. 38 The basic roles in an
ascending scale break down into the main functions of diplomacy,
police or enforcement, and military roles. In Canada these are
reflected in the commitment to NATO, both as a function of
diplomacy bringing economic benefits in trade, and as a defence
through collective security. Consequently the contributions of
forces to NATO and North American defence are the key factors of
Canadian defence policy, 39 and the resultant commitment of
specific units basically determines the minimum size and
composition of the Canadian Forces. This is particularly so of the
maritime forces which in wartime would be completely allocated to
the allied defence commands and in peacetime have commitments
to NATO and North American defence for training purposes as well
37. [1977]4 LMCLQ 623
38. See Ken Booth, Roles, Objectives and Tasks: An inventory of the functions of
Navies, [Summer 1977] U.S. Naval War College Review 83
39. Canadian Government White Paper, Defence in the 70s (1971)
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as commitment of units to major exercises and to the NATO
Standing Naval Force Atlantic. Defence policy must also take into
account the requirements for exercise of sovereignty and indepep-
dent control over national interests and resources. These may be met
by units which would be fully allocated to the allied commands in
wartime but which in peacetime remain under national command
and control. While maintaining combat ready forces to contribute to
deterrence through alliances and collective security, the Canadian
Forces must be prepared for employment in purely national tasks.
40
Additionally there are other commitments assumed from time to
time for United Nations peacekeeping, and assistance to other
countries in emergency or assistance capacities. The policy themes
of sovereignty and security are accordingly combined in the often
re-stated roles of:
1. Sovereignty: including surveillance and enforcement, and
national development;
2. Defence of North America: including peacetime operations
and training;
3. NATO: including peacetime allocations and operations and
training;
4. Peacekeeping: including on-going U.N. commitments,
particularly in Cyprus and the Middle East, which are largely
land forces but which from time to time require naval
support. 41
The minimum size of Canada's maritime forces is thus largely
determined by the requirements for roles 2 and 3, which include 20
to 24 destroyers, 3 operational support ships and 3 submarines, as
well as four squadrons of long range maritime patrol aircraft, and
two squadrons of anti-submarine helicopters (for operation from
destroyers). Additional units are also maintained for national roles
and training purposes. Thus, the CS2F Tracker aircraft, previously
carrier operated and subsequently slated for disposal, in the wake of
40. D.N.D. review, Defence 1976 (Canada: Department of National Defence,
1977) at 5
41. Naval support to Canadian U.N. peacekeeping forces has ranged from sea
transport and support, as provided by H.M.C.S. Bonaventure (aircraft carrier) in
1956 for U.N. forces during the Anglo-French disengagement in Egypt, to
deployment of an operational support ship to Cyprus. Destroyers have been
deployed in emergency support/evacuation roles, as in the despatch of destroyers to
the Mediterranean in contingency support of Canadian peacekeepng forces being
withdrawn from Egypt in 1967, and destroyers which were stationed off Vietnam
on an emergency contingency basis in support of Canadian peacekeeping troops
supervising the armistice and withdrawal of U. S. forces.
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Canada's aircraft carrier, have been retained for the coastal aerial
surveillance function over the EEZ. Other ships including some of
the previous coastal minesweepers and other similar sized patrol
vessels are also retained and used principally for personnel training.
However, under roles 2 and 3 the main tasks of the operational
units, of the defence of North America from submarine launched
missile attack and the defence of the North Atlantic sea lanes,
determine the nature of the threats of submarine, surface or air
launched missiles and torpedo attacks that they must be prepared to
meet and combat. This is the multi-threat environment in which
they must be equipped and trained to fight, resulting in the
increasing sophistication of ships, such as Canada's DDH280 class
of air-defence missile, gun, mortar and torpedo armed destroyers,
fitted with a complex electronics suit and operating two large ASW
"Sea King" helicopters. Such warships are inherently multi-
purpose instruments of policy. 42 Their complexity and sophistica-
tion, however, enhances their capability to carry out the police
functions, and the cost-effectiveness of government expenditures
and pursuit of national interests demands that they be so employed
in addition to their more traditional functions. 43 It may become a
fine balance of priorities as to the extent that one commitment does
not detract from the effectiveness with which the others can be
performed, but in a country which cannot afford the manpower,
capital and operating cost of additional patrol vessels and aircraft by
the separate government departments solely for their individual
policing functions, the support of the other government departments
in enforcement in the EEZ is an essential task of Maritime
Command.
Maritime Command thus provides Canada with a sanctioning
force par excellence, a back-up to civilian government agencies
providing a tangible symbol of law enforcement authority. The
actual military role may have seemed limited but, besides being a
reflection of the distinction in Canada between the civilian and
military areas of responsibility, it is also a reflection of the success
of Canada's extension of jurisdiction and management. The value of
the military enforcement effort cannot be measured directly any
more than can the value of defence capability in peacetime, but
neither can the value of municipal or provincial police forces, or of
42. Supra, note 38 at 96
43. Middlemiss, supra, note I at 331
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policemen on the beat. It is a question of the optimum use of the
means at the national disposal for national goals and support of
national interests. This is not necessarily a universal rule; in the
United States there is a traditionalist school which would restrict the
military to purely military missions. This may lead to a
constitutional question of definition of fisheries protection as a
military mission, resolved in Canada by the extension of national
policies under sovereignty. However, it may also be considered that
a greater use of naval enforcement should not be undertaken without
strong military necessity to preclude the possible offence that may
be more strongly argued in the United States, where the
para-military U.S. Coast Guard is the maritime enforcement
agency, but is not so in Britain where the Royal Navy provides a full
time Fisheries Protection Squadron, nor in Canada where naval
destroyers were authorized for fisheries protection under ICNAF.
IV. Legal Problems in Enforcement
Jurisdiction
The Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT)44 would extend
coastal state jurisdiction over the EEZ to the 200 mile limit for all
aspects of the zone. 45 Canada's present jurisdiction is extended
unilaterally as regards fisheries, 46 while jurisdiction over the
sea-bed and its resources is retained under the Continental Shelf
doctrine of the 1958 Convention. 47 While the Canadian jurisdiction
over fisheries is recognized by the states concerned, there are
problems of defining some of the boundaries. This is particularly so
between Canada and the United States, over areas of George's Bank
between Nova Scotia and Massachusetts, areas of the Strait of Juan
de Fuca and in the Dixon Entrance on the Pacific coast, and in the
Beaufort Sea. While the Canadian claim to an area of George's
Bank is advanced on the basis of the median line between Canada
and the New England coast, denial of the median line doctrine in
favour of a land based demarcation by a previous treaty favours
Canada in the Dixon Entrance. Thus Canada has always claimed
territorial rights to the waters of the Dixon Entrance but has
44. U.N. Document A/CONF. 62 WP 10, Third Conference on the Law of the
Sea, July 15, 1977
45. Id. at Art. 56
46. Supra, note 6
47. Supra, note 21
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permitted U.S.fishermen to fish in the Hecate Strait and Dixon
Entrance. 48 Mr. Romeo Leblanc, the Canadian Minister of
Fisheries has admitted that Canada is in for some hard negotiations
with the United States, but the preparedness of both countries to
come to a common agreement over fisheries shows that the main
problem lies in demarcation of ownership of the resources of the
sea-bed, believed to contain commercially exploitable gas and oil
deposits. Similar problems are also involved in the dispute between
Canada and France over French claims based on the islands of St.
Pierre et Miquelon in the Gulf of St. Lawrence off the south coast of
Newfoundland.
The Charter of the United Nations requires that disputes be settled
by peaceful means. 49 Therefore, in the event of breakdown of
bilateral negotiations the disputes should be resolved either by
reference to the International Court of Justice or by arbitration. As
Canada has refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the International
Court in respect to boundary problems in such cases or in respect to
measures taken for protection of the environment, there remain the
options of continued negotiations or of arbitration. While Canada's
claim on George's Bank is based on an International Court
decision, 50 the conservative approach of the court is unlikely to
recognize the more contemporary views or considerations involved
in Canadian environmental policies which have not yet gained
sufficiently wide acceptance as law in the international community.
However, the interim agreements between Canada and the United
States, and the declared readiness of Canada to submit to arbitration
in the event of failure of negotiations enhance good relations
between the countries and the sharing of the fisheries resources of
the disputed areas. A report has been approved by both countries
recommending a joint fisheries commission and shared hydro-
carbon access zones as the basic principles of settlement. 51 Talks
having produced little progress in defining the boundaries, joint
management and access in as yet undetermined zones may give
sufficient protection to national interests to permit definition of the
shared zones and boundaries. For the fisheries this would be a
workable solution, taking into consideration the fish stocks as a
48. J. G. Castel, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1976) at 256
49. The Charter of the United Nations (1945) at Art. 3
50. The North Sea Continental Shelf cases, [1969] I.C.J.R. 1
51. Halifax Mail-Star, October21, 1977
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whole and their movements, as well as the boundaries and
traditional fishing areas. Hydro-carbons will be a more difficult
resource to share. While the accord is apparently based on rights of
purchase guaranteeing each country access to half the production,
there may still be problems of an agreed developmental time table
and of royalties and licensing fees. As negotiations continue it is
likely that those details will be resolved either by the final bilateral
treaty or a commission established under it.
Jurisdiction over Shipping beyond the Territorial Sea
For the time being Canada lives with the limitation of flag-state
jurisdiction over shipping in the EEZ in respect to environmental
protection. As to matters of jurisdiction over fisheries, even in the
more peripheral matters, flag states have been ready to take any
necessary action. 52 However, in respect to environmental jurisdic-
tion and pollution prevention matters this leaves problems of
jurisdiction over ships passing through the EEZ but not calling at
Canadian ports, and over vessels supplying or tending oil rigs in the
EEZ which are usually foreign registered and often operated out of
United States ports. The mutual interests of the United States and
Canada coming more closely together in this respect, will probably
ensure adequate supervision of oil rig tenders.
Implementation of safety measures under the Canada Shipping
Act is effective in promoting the safety of vessels calling at
Canadian ports, but does not preclude an "Argo Merchant" or
"Amoco Cadiz" type of catastrophe, particularly of a deep draught
VLCC in shallow off-shore areas such as Scatari Bank. While the
coastal state may take action to mitigate or eliminate a grave and
imminent danger to its coastline under conventions of 196953 and
1973, 54 it is action post factum, too late to prevent the accident. The
fact that the 1973 Convention on Prevention of Pollution55 has not
52. In response to a routine mention of a minor accident during the boarding and
inspection of a Soviet trawler, in which no injury or damages occurred but in
respect to which appropriate safety measures were requested, the Soviet response
was immediate and unexpected. Not only were greater safety measures assured, but
it was also stated that the master would be punished.
53. 1969 Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties
54. Protocol relating to Intervention on the High Seas in cases of Marine Pollution
by substances other than oil (1973)
55. International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships, London,
November 2, 1973. For more comprehensive prevention of pollution.
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yet had a sufficient number of ratifications to come into effect
provides more concern to Canada, and there may yet be a need for
further unilateral action should there be evidence of an increased
threat, as may be caused by new oil terminals in or near Canadian
waters. On the other hand, the 1969 International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage is in force providing
liability of the shipowner for pollution damage by oil only, but it is
limited to vessels carrying over 2000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo and
is limited to 2000 gold francs per ton to a maximum of 210 million
gold francs, except where the fault or privity of the owner is proved.
This is completely inadequate for the costs and damages in an
"Amoco Cadiz" scale of disaster. Canadian policy and regulations
impose strict liability on the shipowner and the owner of the cargo,
for costs of pollution, clean-up and consequential damages. Once
again, the international measures are not enough 56 to make up for
the present short-fall of Canadian jurisdiction. In the United States
where there was initially strong opposition to Canadian unilateral
legislation, legislation under the U.S. Water Pollution Control Act
goes further than the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and
consequently the United States did not ratify the convention. 
57
The extent of jurisdiction of the ECAREG Vessel Traffic
Management System also remains questionable. 58 The reporting
requirements for an in-bound vessel to give 24 hours notice in her
initial report provides information on the movements of inbound
vessels well beyond the EEZ. Warning notices or advisory
information can then be promulgated, but it does not apply to ships
passing through the EEZ between foreign ports. It may be argued
that such ships pass sufficiently off-shore to preclude being a hazard
but in light of the "Argo Merchant" 59 and other possible accidents,
such as the "Berge Istra" 60 this is debatable. With an effective port
r6gime such as Canada's, "rogue ships" may soon disappear, as oil
companies wishing to use Canadian ports are becoming more
scrupulous with respect to the ships they employ and, with the
56. See E. Gold, Pollution of the Sea and International law: A Canadian
Perspective (1971-72), 3 J.M.L.C. 13 at 39 and44
57. A. J. Kuffler, The Water Pollution Control Act - U.S. Response to Water
Pollution caused by Ships [ 1977 ] I LMCLQ 1
58. Supra, note 27
59. The Argo Merchant grounded and broke up 27 miles off Nantucket Island,
spilling 7.6 million gallons of oil, December, 1976.
60. The Berge Istra, a new VLCC, blew up and sank in the Pacific Ocean,
January, 1976.
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current surplus of tanker shipping, old and inadequately equipped
ships will find charters harder to obtain. The "Berge Istra",
however, was a new ship, and the problem may switch from the one
of old ships to a shortage of sufficiently trained personnel to
properly man and operate the newer ones. The dangers of
navigation in Canadian waters even beyond the territorial sea are
thus likely to become more significant, and the considerations of an
oil terminal at Eastport, Maine, requiring entry through Canadian
waters in the Bay of Fundy, and of a liquid natural gas terminal at
Lorneville, New Brunswick, also on the Bay of Fundy, raise the
possibilities of increased dangers in a new focal area already well
known for its inherent natural hazards of narrow channels, strong
tides and preponderance of fog. The possibility of one VLCC
in-bound, with another out-bound crossing with one or more Liquid
Natural Gas carriers and conventional merchant shipping, as well as
local shipping and fishing vessels does not equate to the denseness
of traffic of the English Channel, but has great inherent dangers
with possibly disastrous consequences. In such a situation there is a
strong case for the compulsory extension of Vessel Traffic
Management much further to seaward than present jurisdiction
permits. In comparison to civil aviation, shipping has remained
unrestricted and uncontrolled, following the old principle of the
freedom of the seas and under the influence of shipping states and
lobbies. 61 The increase of vessel traffic management schemes
reflects the recognized need for greater degrees of shipping control,
so that if Canada did act unilaterally in such a situation she would
likely gain a great measure of support.
Prosecution also raises problems of jurisdiction in respect to
offences beyond the territorial sea and the difficulty of effective
flag-state action. In some cases flag-states are conscientious, but
prosecution through the flag-state may still be a long and
complicated process, 62 while in some cases it is difficult if not
impossible to bring the owners into court, 63 and the search may end
up in a Panamanian filing cabinet.
64
61. See R. M. M'Gonigle and M. W. Zacher, Canadian Foreign Policy and
Marine Pollution, supra, note I at 101
62. R. v. Federal Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.; R. v. Moran [1973], 3 All E.R. 849
(C.A.)
63. The Torrey Canyon. See Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty (2nd ed.
New York: The Foundation Press, 1975) at 840-843; Gold, supra, note 56 at 21
64. The Arrow, the Canadian Torrey Canyon, grounded in Chedabucto Bay, N.S.
See Gold, supra, note 56 at 32-34
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Hot Pursuit in the EEZ
Hot pursuit is authorized as a means of extended jurisdiction to
effect the arrest of a fleeing vessel detected in violation of the
coastal state's laws, providing it is initiated within the territorial sea
or contiguous zone, 65 to permit the arrest of the offending vessel on
the high seas. There is, however, debate as to the circumstances in
which the doctrine may be extended for the arrest of a vessel for an
offence beyond the territorial sea and contiguous zone. By the 1958
Convention it may be initiated for the breach of any of the laws of
the coastal state within the territorial sea, but by a literal reading of
Article 23 it is limited in the contiguous zone to offences in respect
to fiscal, customs, immigration or sanitary offences. This confirms
the ruling in the case of The "I'm Alone", 66 the Canadian registered
schooner detected 10.8 miles off the Louisiana coast while
rum-running, which after a lengthy pursuit was sunk by a U.S.
Coast Guard Cutter. The Court held that the pursuit was legal and
that the United States could use the necessary and reasonable force
to effect boarding and seizure. While it may be asked under which
heading, fiscal, customs or sanitary rum-running fell, it is
noteworthy that the 1958 Convention does not include fishing, and
by the then existing law would limit such authority for fisheries to a
maximum of 12 miles off-shore or from the baseline of the
territorial sea. The law is imprecise as to the extent of the doctrine to
offences against laws and regulations respecting the sea-bed and its
resources on the continental shelf but, on the other hand, the ICNT
would extend the doctrine to offences in respect to the EEZ. 67 One
learned writer68 has maintained that under present international law
the right does not apply to areas of purely fisheries jurisdiction.
State practice, however, has indicated an increasing application of
the doctrine for fisheries violations in fisheries zones beyond the
territorial sea.
In the case of The F/V 'Taiyo Maru" 69 a Japanese fishing vessel
was arrested on the high seas 67.9 miles off-shore after hot pursuit
had been initiated on detection of a fishing violation 10.5 miles off
65. 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas at Art. 23
66. The I'm Alone (Canada v. United States) in Hackworth, 2 Digest of
International Law (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1941) at 703-708
67. Supra, note 44 at Art. 111
68. N. M. Poulantzas, The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law (Leyden:
Sijthoff, 1969) at 186
69. (1975), 395 F. Supp. 413 at 415 (D.Me.)
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Monhegan Is. The defence moved for dismissal of the case on the
contention that as a signatory to the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas, the United States had limited its territorial authority to
commence hot pursuit from the contiguous zone to the areas
prescribed and could not seize a vessel on the high seas for breach of
a domestic fisheries law. It was held that being a signatory had not
limited U.S. authority, as the language of Article 24 of the
Convention did not preclude a state from establishing a contiguous
zone for purposes other than those enumerated. Therefore, hot
pursuit from an exclusive fisheries zone did not violate the
Convention and jurisdiction was not barred. In a similar Canadian
case in the same year, the F/V "Koyo Maru" No. 270 was detected
in breach of Canadian fisheries regulations in Queen Charlotte
Sound, tracked by aircraft and arrested by a destroyer on patrol off
Vancouver Island. There was a break in the aerial surveillance but
the destroyer sighted her just within the fisheries closing line,
heading for the high seas. Records did not indicate whether hot
pursuit was properly initiated although there is no doubt that it was
effective, the "Koyo Maru" being arrested some four miles outside
the closing line. The defence made a motion for dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction which was dismissed on the basis that the right of hot
pursuit was properly exercisable from a fisheries zone.
In a commentary on the right of hot pursuit, Eric Allan Sisco7
1
similar to Poulantzas 7 2 limited the right of hot pursuit under Article
23 of the Convention to an act for which the contiguous zone was
established that would have effect on the territory or territorial sea
of the coastal state, and that therefore this does not extend to
authority for hot pursuit from a fisheries zone, as the United States
did not mitigate the territorial limitation of its authority. Mr. Sisco
therefore argued that "the court's finding that the United States did
not agree to refrain from the initiation of hot pursuit in a contiguous
fisheries zone is logically flawed". Apart from the direct national
interest which had prompted the declaration of a contiguous fishing
zone and passage of domestic fisheries legislation in the first place,
a breach of such regulations and depletion of the fisheries resources
by unrestricted foreign fishing would certainly have an effect in the
territorial sea and within the state. There would be few (or no) fish,
70. The "Koyo Maru" No. 2, R. v.toh (April 23, 1975), No. 164/75 (B.C.C.A.)
71. E. A. Sisco, Hot Pursuit from a Contiguous Fisheries Zone (1976-77), 14 S.
Diego L. Rev. 656
72. Supra, note 68
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and consequential economic effects on the people, which would
seem due cause for the preventive action taken and its enforcement.
As Lord Reid commented in the House of Lords: "The lifeblood of
the law is not logic but common sense". 73 Thus, where a
contiguous zone is established, be it a 12 or 24 mile contiguous zone
or a 200 mile fisheries or exclusive economic zone, in respect to
which laws are enacted it is logical and common sense that
enforcement stems from the legislation and that hot pursuit is a right
arising out of the zone qua contiguous even though otherwise an
area of the high seas. To give the right to establish such a zone, as
being recognized by international laws, but to preclude the right of
hot pursuit in its enforcement is neither logical nor common sense.
In implementing such extended right of hot pursuit, however,
new complications may arise. For instance, where the hot pursuit of
a vessel from the EEZ of one state goes into the adjacent EEZ of that
vessel's own state, could government vessels of that state claim
jurisdiction to force a cessation of pursuit? In the Canada-United
States situation in which agreement on fisheries jurisdiction and
easy working relationships tend to prevail this may be an academic
question. In cases of lengthy pursuit in which the fleeing vessel
reaches the EEZ of her flag state while under hot pursuit from the
Canadian (or another distant) EEZ this may indicate ineffectiveness
of action by delay and slowness to effect arrest, a maritime laches,
but in other cases of shorter distances the factor could be critical if
the hot pursuit were broken off on entry into the flag state EEZ.
However, under the ICNT the problem is plainly dealt with by the
overriding statement that hot pursuit ceases on entry into the
territorial sea of the pursued vessel or of a third state, 74 continuing
the present principle of international law. 75 This development of
international law therefore has a basis of previous international law
by cases and custom to form the further interpretation of
international law should UNCLOS III fail to produce a final treaty.
Legality and Authorityfor the Use of Force
The arrest of an offending vessel may require the display or the use
of some degree of force. The critical issue is what degree of force is
justified? In the case of The ''I'm Alone" 76 the Mixed Committee of
73. R. v. Smith (Roger), (1975] A.C. 476,500
74. Supra, note 44 at Art. 111(3)
75. Supra, note 65 at Art. 23(2)
76. Supra, note 66
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Arbitration held that the necessary and reasonable force to effect the
boarding, searching, seizing and bringing into port of the suspected
vessel might be used, and if sinking should occur incidentally the
pursuing vessel might be entirely blameless. However, in the
U.K.-Denmark fisheries dispute, the firing of a solid shot without
warning by a Danish frigate on the British trawler "Red
Crusader' 77 was held to have been an excessive use of force, even
though the trawler had escaped from arrest and was making off with
the Danish boarding party virtually locked up. 78 The use of force
has also been supported, where deemed necessary, by the U.N.
Security Council, 79 as where the use of force was authorized to
prevent the entry into Beira of ships carrying oil for Rhodesia. The
extent of force used must clearly consider the consequences,
including the loss of human life and the possible damage or injury to
third parties. Further, there is the possibility that either the action
taken or the arrest will not be upheld in court with liability ensuing
for improper arrest and damages. However, in most cases a vessel
under hot pursuit is unlikely to continue her flight when pursued by
a naval vessel. On the other hand where an action to arrest is
unsuccessful, as in the case of the U.S. West Coast fishing vessel
boarded by a Canadian fisheries inspector from a small Fisheries
boat, which refused to be arrested and made off into U.S. waters
with the inspector still onboard, prosecution through the flag state
may prove an adequate alternative. That case also showed the lack
of back up enforcement capability and the unsatisfactory capability
and characteristics of that Fisheries vessel, which was little faster
than the fishing boat and was only able to recover the inspector with
difficulty and danger.
Canadian authorities in the EEZ are likely to consider all aspects
of the situation before authorizing the use of the minimal force
necessary. This should not provide encouragement to violators who
seek to leave without regard to pursuit and find themselves looking
at the wrong end of a gun. The restrained but resolute demonstration
of authority will usually achieve the end. Where this is not so, there
must be an authoritative decision whether the end justifies the
means. While it may be necessary for the credibility of jurisdiction
to make an arrest after a flagrant violation or a series of violations,
the end may also be achieved by diplomatic means, especially in the
77. The Red Crusader (1962), 35 I.L.R. 485
78. Supra, note 68 at 236-237
79. Id. at 252
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case of fisheries by the revocation of licenses and by sanctions. In
the Latin-American states, and even the United States, this may be
considered too weak an approach, inviting further violations rather
than preventing repetition by swift and stringent prosecution.
However, in the Canadian EEZ the licensing and quota system
provides a useful means of ensuring compliance. The decision as to
the use of force is thus basically a ministerial one in the
circumstances of the case, though the final decision as to the extent
of force or action to be taken may be with the commanding officer
of the naval vessel,80 as the prerogative and risk of command. In
certain situations in which only he can judge, requirements for
enforcement of authority or to effect the objective may require some
degree, or higher degree, of force in circumstances which give
insufficient time for reference to higher authority. This has not been
the Canadian experience, but is one which is often discussed in
naval seminars on law of the sea and in briefings by naval staffs.
Force has not had to be used, although on occasions the quick
response and inherent authority of a naval vessel have been
sufficient to effect the arrest. This reflects not a display of force but
the success of the underlying diplomacy in acceptance of
jurisdiction and the policies of management and resource sharing
under which the revocation of licenses or quotas may be a most
effective weapon.
The use of naval ships in fisheries protection, however, is a
tangible symbol of authority and resolve, and experience has shown
that governments are usually reluctant to involve themselves or their
ships in incidents or challenges to such enforcement. However,
should there be a change of diplomatic climate, in which a state
would wish to dispute jurisdiction over the EEZ, it is more likely to
be a challenge supported by demonstrative superiority rather than by
an open use of force. It is unlikely that either side would wish to
slide into open warfare, 81 so that the demonstrative force must be
suited to the situation and have flexible capability controlled by
effective carefully considered rules of engagement. This is
particularly so for the enforcing units for whom good surveillance
capability and data co-ordination are vital. Canadian naval ships,
especially the DDH280 class are unsuitable from several aspects
such as light ASW design and construction and thin-skin
80. Discussion with staff of the Commander, Maritime Command
81. D. P. O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1975) at 183
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vulnerability, as well as complexity and cost. On the other hand
they are fast, with excellent communications and information
co-ordination, while their helicopters can provide surveillance over
a wide area. The gun is, however, essential for warning and for the
minimal show of force, so what does a naval ship without a gun do
in this role? For navies in a possible confrontation area the specialist
roles developed for ships, particularly ASW, may thus be
detrimental, as is an over-preponderance of missilery. Naval staffs
must therefore consider not only the wartime purpose but a general
purpose capability in design that will provide flexibility and
effectiveness in peacetime or periods of tension. In a small ship,
"general purpose" can, by seeking to place too little of too much in
too small, frustrate its own ends, but the Soviet Navy has shown the
Western maritime nations how a judicious weapon mix can provide
the necessary trumps for most surface situations, for example, the
"Krivak" class; while their cruisers have developed their blue
water ocean capability to range from flag showing and surface gun
capability to advanced missilery and ASW. It is the law of the sea
that dictates the practicalities of the use of military units in
peacetime, related to the area and modes of exercise. Changes in the
law as well as changes in political amity or tension bear on the
nature of enforcement as well as deterrence. 82 Naval staffs as well
as their ships must be capable of appreciation and reaction to a wide
range of situations; however, the role of the diplomat is a vital
adjunct in a partnership for extension and acceptance of jurisdiction,
as well as its enforcement.
Canadian Success in the EEZ
Canadian success commenced with the early initiatives in UNCLOS
III to gain acceptance of the principle of the EEZ, and in the
working of the conference and resolution of conflicts and problems
by the procedures of consultation and consensus rather than votes.
Despite critical differences on some issues and viewpoints, the
conference has thus continued to make progress, albeit haltingly,
from session to session. While there are those who doubt the final
outcome of a treaty and success in UNCLOS 111,83 the main
elements of the future law of the sea are clear, including: 84
82. Id. at 189
83. E.g., see R. J. Samuelson, Law of the Sea Treaty-Talk, Talk, Talk and More
Talk, International Report National Journal (August 27, 1977) at 1337
84. Arvid Pardo, The Emerging Law of the Sea and World Order, Banquet
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1. a 12 mile territorial sea, measured from straight baselines
with very flexible criteria, subject to the right of innocent
passage under re-defined conditions;
2. some measure of unimpeded passage through straits used for
international navigation, subject to certain safeguards for the
littoral states;
3. a 24 mile contiguous zone, measured from the baselines of
the territorial sea;
4. a 200 mile exclusive economic zone measured from the
territorial sea baselines with rights over resources and a
comprehensive jurisdiction subject to innocent passage and
an undetermined extent of flag state jurisdiction or
safeguards;
5. an international r6gime of some kind for the administration of
resources of the deep sea-bed as the common heritage of
mankind, with some degree of jurisdiction or benefit sharing
over the sea-bed resources beyond 200 miles on the
continental margin;
6. recognition of archipelagic principles; and
7. a duty of preservation of the environment which will give
some greater recognition of coastal state jurisdiction and
possibly port state jurisdiction in respect to pollution by
ships.
Many Canadian initiatives and policies will be seen in this and,
whether there is a treaty or not, the elements are becoming accepted
by a greater number of states and will likely form the basis of a
development of law of the sea by custom if not by treaty. It will give
Canada much of what she wants and still leave the door open for
further negotiations on a regional or bi-lateral level, while the trend
towards a greater regulatory rather than advisory role for IMCO in
respect to anti-pollution measures may also develop. Canada has
been a prime mover in the development of international law in
international fora as well as in the national sense by unilateral and
bi-lateral actions. The fisheries r6gime of the EEZ is a unique
success of diplomacy, management and enforcement, assuring
Canada of protection of her fisheries and of a prime share, albeit at
the cost of extensive management, conservation and research
efforts. Costs for this will continue to rise in 1978 and, while
foreign quotas have been drastically cut, strict conservation
measures have also been applied to the Canadian fisheries to make
sure that foreign over-fishing is not replaced with Canadian
over-fishing. As Romeo Leblanc said:
address, Proceedings of the 10th Annual Conference on the Law of the Sea,
University of Rhode Island, 1976, at 403 et seq.
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We see 1977 as the bottom of the trough for the groundfish
catch. With good management it should be possible within ten
years to restore groundfish stocks to their full potential with an
annual yield of 1.6 million tons, which is more than double the
1977 total allowable catch. 
85
With such benefits, the Canadian fishing industry can look forward
to a re-birth, and already provincial plans for redevelopment of the
fisheries in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia are being made. 8
6
There have been substantial reductions in foreign quotas of cod,
redfish and flatfish off Newfoundland leaving the foreign fleets in
1977 with the bulk of the allowable catches in capelin, roundnose
grenadier, silver hake, argentine and squid; types not generally
fished by Canada. In 1978 foreign quotas of redfish will be reduced
further and the foreign quotas of cod will be limited to the Labrador
Sea. Also in 1978 an additional $4 to $6 million will be spent in
fisheries research, amplified by more detailed reporting by foreign
vessels and selected foreign vessels which will carry Canadian
scientific observers, and a number of co-operative survey
experiments have been initiated with foreign research vessels. In
DOE (Fisheries) Regional Operations Centres, FLASH, the Foreign
Fishing Vessels Licensing and Surveillance Hierarchical Informa-
tion computerized data system keeps a constant record of vessels,
catches and quotas, including detailed information on each vessel
licensed, what she can fish for, where and when, and with what
gear. While initially a means of enforcement and control, the
system is in fact also a tool for research and rehabilitation of the
fisheries, in the long term interests of the foreign fishing vessels
themselves.
While Canadian regulations provide for penalties of fines up to
$25,000.00, confiscation of catch, gear or even the vessel, as well
as loss of licenses and quotas, or even imprisonment up to two
years, the actual penalties invoked have been moderate - fines of
$5,000.00 to $7,000.00 plus seizure of the catch and gear. This is in
marked contrast to a U.S. fine of $250,000.00, and it is noteworthy
that among some 500 foreign fishing vessels licensed in 1977 to fish
in the Canadian EEZ over different times, there were only 15
85. Report of the Minister of Fisheries, Ottawa, The Halifax Mail-Star, October
18, 1977
86. See The Halifax Mail-Star, December 15, 1977: a $2.5 million provincial
subsidy programme for the construction of 20 new 65 foot Nova Scotia inshore
trawlers.
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foreign violations. While it is quite possible that not all violations
have been detected or all catches maintained absolutely within the
prescribed quotas, the verification by boarding and surveillance, as
against the small number of violations, most of which were minor
infractions of area or license dates, would seem to confirm the
Minister's report of a smooth and effective transition. 
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The Future of the Canadian EEZ
The Future of the EEZ in the Law of the Sea
Arvid Pardo commented on the EEZ as one of the main elements of
the future law of the sea.88 As a principle it has been propounded or
accepted by most important areas or states, the early Latin
American principles,8 9 the declarations of the African states, 90 and
the unilateral declarations of the two "super-powers" as well as the
major states with interests in shipping, fishing and deep sea-bed
technology and research. 9' In the Middle East, Saudi-Arabia,
initially aligned with the Third World against the Western nations,
now supports the 12 mile territorial sea and a 200 mile economic
zone, and has placed reliance on the median line and equidistance
principles to resolve disputes over demarcation problems of
off-shore boundaries. 9 2 As a state with significant resources at its
disposal, Saudi-Arabia exerts considerable influence in the Middle
East and it is important that in that area, with the exception of the
problem of transit through straits, the Saudi position is generally in
alignment with the Western position and developments in UNCLOS
III. In Canada's case it has gained wide acceptance by the interested
states through bilateral treaties. Its effects are causing a general
re-deployment of foreign fishing, barred off Iceland, and drastically
reduced by the U.S.S.R. which introduced tough quotas in the
87. See Middlemiss, supra, note 1 at 336. However, Middlemiss is not correct in
the passivity of enforcement techniques. While most of the effort is in surveillance,
it is a watchful supervision which is essential to enforcement of the licensing
system; while boarding which is actively pursued, goes to supeivision of quotas
and methods.
88. Supra, note 84
89. Declaration of the Latin American States on the Law of the Sea (Lima
Declaration, August 8, 1970)
90. African States' Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea, Yaound6, June 20-30,
1972
91. United States, U.S.S.R., European Economic Community, Norway, De-
nmark, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Costa Rica.
92. J. P. Piscatori, Saudi-Arabia and the Law of the Sea (1977), 29 U.S. Naval
War College Review 53
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Barents Sea for 1978, 93 while Soviet fishing in the EEC area has
been reduced to quotas in ICNAF areas of mostly low value fish.
94
Many countries have idle fishing vessels, including Britain and
West Germany, the latter with 40 modem stem trawlers with the
latest freezing and processing facilities searching for new fishing
grounds .95
While the generally accepted limit of the EEZ is 200 miles, 96 this
limit has not been unanimously accepted, particularly by Canada,
subject to compromise over the benefits of the outer reaches of the
continental shelf9 7 and the rights of the coastal state to exploration
and exploitation of resources, 98 even though payments or
contribution in kind are called for from the coastal state. 99 Thus, if
there is a treaty some form of control or supervision of exploitation
by the coastal state on the continental margin beyond 200 miles will
probably be exercised by the International Sea-bed Authority, while
the resources of the deep sea-bed would come under that authority.
To satisfy what would otherwise possibly be a blocking vote by the
land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states, an equitable
arrangement of benefits is essential in respect to the areas beyond
200 miles. On the other hand, fisheries stocks beyond the 200 mile
limit on the continental margin would be vulnerable to over-fishing,
affecting the stocks within the limit, and thus need regional
management.
Canadian Jurisdiction and Authority in the EEZ
While the 1958 Conventions are generally pass6, the Convention on
the Continental Shelf may remain a basis for states claims until it is
replaced by a new treaty. In the absence of a new treaty, the
principles of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea would also
continue, though modified by customary acceptance of a breadth of
12 miles, which would remain subject to variations of claims by
individual states. Canada's 12 mile territorial sea would be in
keeping with international law developed in the past and evolved by
custom. The 200 mile EEZ being accepted, there would remain the
93. The Times, London, September 28, 1977
94. The Times, London, October 1, 1977
95. The Halifax Mail-Star, October 18, 1977
96. ICNT, supra, note 9 at Art. 57
97. Id. at Art. 76
98. Id. at Art. 77
99. Id. at Art. 82
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question of jurisdiction over foreign shipping in the EEZ, in respect
of which the right of innocent passage would continue, but the
re-definition, although accepted to preclude damage to the
environment, would not be re-modified and would be open to
interpretation and probably subject to a greater degree of coastal
state legislation.
The principle of baselines for measurement of the territorial sea is
well established and would continue, though their application would
become more liberal. In Canada's case this could result in final
closure of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy, Queen
Charlotte Sound and the Dixon Entrance by baselines rather than
fisheries closure lines, turning those bodies of water into inland
waters, but having little effect on Canada's off-shore claim in
respect to the EEZ. Management of fisheries would continue in the
EEZ, while beyond the 200 mile limit the regional approach would
tend to be followed, with a persuasive influence of modifications to
quotas inside the EEZ as an alternative. However, in areas of
conflict Canada's adeptness at diplomacy may pull her through
some further disputes where joint interests are concerned by
bi-lateral or multi-lateral conventions. On the other hand,
Canadians can take a tough stand, as in a dispute with the Soviet
Union before establishment of the EEZ when Canadian ports were
closed to Soviet vessels.
Protection of the Environment
Canada has used her jurisdiction in the territorial sea and a tough
port r6gime to impose safety standards on shipping using her ports,
and as a basis for vessel traffic management. In return shipping has
been handled expeditiously and benefitted through improved
services. The 80% voluntary compliance with ECAREG is a good
indication that 100% compliance on a compulsory basis will be
feasible, and that inspections under the Canada Shipping Act will
weed out the sub-standard ships. This jurisdiction can continue
without a Law of the Sea Treaty but the question remains whether
this is enough. In UNCLOS III, at the fifth session it became clear
that Canada's extreme stand was not acceptable and her policy may
have to be considerably modified.100 On the other hand the United
States is taking an increasingly tougher position herself in respect to
100. See M'Gonigle and Zacher, supra, note 61, giving a review of the
development of Canadian policy and its progress in international fora.
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pollution prevention 1 ° ' and the movement in IMCO to combat
tanker accidents and pollution, and to drop the "consultative"
apsect may be the harbinger of acceptance of the Canadian
viewpoint. However, in seeking full coastal state jurisdiction over
construction, fitment and manning standards Canada faces a broad
spectrum of states with shipping interests, including some of the
developing countries with maritime ambitions, who together pose
too strong an opposition to individual coastal state standards. Such
standards may therefore be attained more easily through interna-
tional regulations, in which IMCO will have the key role. This
would be in keeping with the provisions of the ICNT.102
In respect to pollution from vessels, the ICNT proposal is based
on the development of international rules and standards for the
prevention and control of pollution, to be developed through the
competent international organization, presumably meaning IMCO.
It would then require flag states to enact laws and regulations in
respect to their shipping having at least the same effect as the
international rules and standards, while permitting coastal states to
enact laws and regulations in respect to their EEZ giving effect to
the generally accepted international rules and standards. While the
intent of this is clearly to set these standards through IMCO, the
differences of interest of the flag states and the coastal state may be
developed into a double, or higher standard by sub-paragraph 3 of
Article 212, permitting states in the exercise of their sovereignty
within their territorial sea to establish national laws and regulations
for the prevention of pollution from ships, except that such laws
should not hamper ships on innocent passage. In recognizing the
double standard, the article returns us to the basic problem of who
sets what standards where? The collision of two 330,000 ton
tankers, reported on 16 December 1977,103 20 miles off the coast of
South Africa draws attention to another aspect of the problem of
standards. These ships were modern, well fitted sister ships and it is
likely the problem lay in personnel standards and training rather
than breakdown. Coastal states are justified in questioning the
efficiency of international standards and regulations until they see
101. U.S. Water Pollution Control Act and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
provide legislation under which tough regulations are being developed.
102. ICNT, supra, note 44 at Art. 212
103. Halifax Mail-Star, December 16, 1977, reporting the collision twenty miles
off Port Elizabeth, South Africa, of the two sister super-tankers VenOil and Ven
Pet.
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less opposition from the maritime interests and more concerted
efforts by the maritime states to regulate themselves.
Article 212 may provide a further catch-straw for coastal states in
sub-paragraph 5, on the grounds that a particular clearly defined
area of their EEZ, for technical and ecological reasons, requires the
adoption of special mandatory methods. This would seem to cover
the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, but is limited by the
cliff hanger that the adoption of special measures can only be after
consultation through the international organization (IMCO) with
any other countries concerned. This may be read to mean other
countries concerned with that particular area, or merely any country
concerned with those sorts of regulations and standards. Even
without specific definition of that, the consultative process is a sure
method of delaying and probably in the long run preventing any
such regulations unless they are declared unilaterally. Further, the
enforcement provisions under Article 221104 do not provide
authority, even in the territorial sea for the enforcement of national
laws other than those based on the international standards. Such
provisions in the draft do not argue well for the extension or
implementation of extended coastal state jurisdiction without a
treaty. However, without a treaty the way may still be open for a
sufficiently aroused lobby of coastal states, including Canada and
the United States, to seek higher standards and stricter action
through IMCO, which may then also be the prelude to coastal state
legislation of jurisdiction.
So far IMCO has been a consultative organization and as such
unsuccessful in implementing sufficiently high standards for
pollution control, liability or prevention. In 1973 the administration
of the American Environmental Protection Agency proposed the
creation of a Maritime Environment Protection Committee within
IMCO, to preclude a similar body in UNCLOS III in which
developed countries would have less say, and to discourage
demands for broad coastal state jurisdiction by providing IMCO
with a body to set standards for all the seas, including special
areas. 10 5 Now the United States is pressing IMCO for action on
tanker safety 10 6 and is holding unilateral action as a veiled threat.
Among the shipping interests, however, it is noteworthy that the
Liberian Shipping Council is urging the Liberian Bureau of
104. ICNT, supra, note 44 at Art. 221
105. See M'Gonigle and Zacher, supra, note 61 at 135
106. [1977] LMCLQ 609 at 623
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Maritime Affairs to implement regulations requiring Liberian
registered ships to have six-monthly inspections and spot checks, to
eliminate unsatisfactory ships from Liberian registry. Within IMCO
the wind of change is also indicated by the proposed change of
name, deleting the word "consultative", signifying a move towards
a more authoritative and regulatory role, helped by the growth of
membership including many coastal states which will diminish the
influence of the previously controlling maritime lobby. In this light,
the Canadian stand on standards may take on a new leading role in
the international organization to achieve generally applicable high
standards while recognizing the requirements for coastal state
jurisdiction over certain special areas for environmental and
ecological reasons, such as the Arctic, and other areas of particular
hazards.
With development of a new international standard in respect to
shipping safety and the influence of Canadian standards in the
Canadian port regime, the greatest danger to the environment in the
approaches to port may be adequately controlled. There remains the
aspect of the extent of the effects of any disaster off-shore. Canada
recognized and acted on this in the Arctic, combatting the threat
with stringent regulations, 10 7 which nevertheless provide additional
services without which such shipping operations would be
prohibitively hazardous and in the event of serious ice conditions,
impossible.10 8 However, the possibility of human error causing a
grounding or collision off-shore remains and would not be
prevented by flag state jurisdiction. It may be debatable whether it
would be prevented by coastal state jurisdiction, but in that case the
coastal state being aware of the danger would have authority to
impose such measures as would be most likely to preclude or
minimize the risk, which the flag state perhaps would not appreciate
even if it were in a position to do anything about it. However, just as
the flag states object to the possibility of multiplicity of standards
that might result from coastal state jurisdiction, how can a
multiplicity of coastal states take adequate measures for specific
dangers or dangerous areas directly off-shore? This is recognized in
107. Nordreg, Regulations issued under the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act, R.S.C. 1970 (lst Supp.), c.2
108. The s.s. Manhattan, even though she was specially reconstructed for
operations in the Arctic ice in the attempt to prove a commercial exploitation of the
Northwest Passage by tankers for Alaskan oil, was defeated by the ice. Without the
help of the C .C .G.S. John A. MacDonald she would have been trapped in the ice.
Future Enforcement of the Exclusive Economic Zone
the provisions authorizing coastal state jurisdiction in respect to ice
covered areas' 0 9 which, if accepted, will give authority for
Canada's unilateral legislation in the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act. This was a major success for Canada's stand but
was only achieved by unremitting efforts of her diplomats and by
the separation of the Arctic as an exception which was of little
concern to most maritime states. 11° The application of Part XX of
the Canada Shipping Act"', (Pollution), to the Fisheries Zones
under the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, albeit in the
extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles in 1970, may be a
precursor to further pollution control zones in the future. In such
event, the reservation precluding the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice would put the Canadian action beyond legal
challenge, subject then to the adequacy of enforcement.
In the event of disaster, when the ship cannot be saved, or is a
direct threat, intervention becomes necessary for the protection of
the environment rather than the safety of the ship. In the case of the
Portuguese trawler "Vasco del Oro" in St. John's, Nfld., the ship
being within Canadian jurisdiction of the inland waters, was
initially towed out to seaward but broke adrift and went on the rocks
in the harbour entrance, where she was burnt to preclude any
pollution from the oil in her bunkers. This came under the Canada
Shipping Act" l2 which also provides for the recovery of costs of
such action. 113 Beyond the 12 mile limit Canada might act under the
1969 Convention" 4 but the limited extent of ratification of this
convention and the increasing tanker traffic and continuing
casualties point to the requirement for greater coastal state
jurisdiction. The general practices of shipping, as bilges are pumped
by freighters and tankers clean tanks or discharge ballast
notwithstanding "load on top" methods, still cause concern. With
the moves to improve the standards of flag state registers, 115 the
pressures put on sub-standard tanker owners through international
measures and operational competitiveness may force them to seek
further loopholes in jurisdiction and havens of less particular
109. ICNT, supra, note 44 at Art. 235
110. See M'Gonigle and Zacher, supra, note 61 at 142
111. S.C. 1971,c. 27, s. 727(2 )
112. Id. at s. 729: Removal of ships in distress.
113. Id. at s.729(2) and s.734(2)
114. International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties, Brussels, November 29, 1969
115. Supra, note 106
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registry to enable them to continue operations. In such cases as are
detected, the difficulties of successful flag state prosecution are
unlikely to give satisfaction to the coastal state, but Canada would
be faced then even in the areas where traffic management systems
already exist, with the expense and enforcement efforts necessary.
However, the jurisdiction to take police action to arrest a ship and
bring her into port for prosecution, and the ability to inflict a high
penalty, could provide a more significant deterrent.
In respect to direct control of shipping for safety purposes, the
capabilities and limitations of radar and navigational fixing aids
from shore will limit the area covered from any one control station.
Advisory control would not preclude further human error, but
would provide a means of more directly giving ships advice and
warnings of the area that they are in. Three degrees of shipping
control in the EEZ are therefore possible:
a. Direct Control through Vessel Traffic Management, extend-
ing beyond the 12 mile limit to 25 miles or the limitation by
radar range off-shore;
b. Advisory Control through Vessel Traffic Management,
beyond the area of Direct Control to 50 miles offshore; and
c. Interventionary or Police Control, with the right to
(i) enforcement of pollution regulations and
(ii) intervention including rights of arrest and prosecution
and jurisdiction over casualties to the full limits of the
EEZ.
The extension of ECAREG and NORDREG measures, together
with the attendant benefits to shipping could provide the means,
though the authority may yet have to be created unilaterally. In that
event, the extent to which similar standards are developed
internationally will be a considerable factor in the readiness of states
to accept unilateral enforcement by individual coastal states.
The Continental Shelf
Canada having reserved her rights in respect to the continental shelf
to the full extent of the continental margin under the 1958
Convention, 116 while being prepared for some form of compromise
in respect to the benefits from those resources under the terms of a
final treaty is not likely to compromise if there is no treaty. With no
accepted document of international law to rescind or modify the
1958 Convention or its principle, Canadian jurisdiction would
116. Supra, note 21
Future Enforcement of the Exclusive Economic Zone
continue. The technology to exploit these resources is vested in
multi-national corporations which already comply with Canadian
jurisdiction. Conflicts may develop with regard to the ownership of
particular resources in disputed areas but the success of diplomacy
as in the past 1 7 and in the present" 8 should provide resolution to
similar problems in the future.
V. Future Enforcement in the EEZ
Fisheries Management
Licensing of foreign vessels and joint ventures will continue to
provide for foreign participation in Canadian fisheries resources. To
participate, foreign states will continue to accept Canadian
jurisdiction and the degree of enforcement effort therefore is
unlikely to change in degree or the effort required. However, the
policy of the Minister to increase Canadian quotas as Canadian
capability increases will, if the growth of resources and the increase
of total allowable catches does not increase in proportion, reduce
foreign quotas and increase the possibility of violations. It is likely
therefore that penalties for violations will become stiffer in respect
to individual offenders, and that action in certain cases will include
revocation of the licence and quota. Apart from the effect on the
individual offenders, the growing demand for fish food and the
general re-alignment and relocation of fishing efforts under the
general imposition of EEZs, will make such action an effective
lever on foreign states. Fines mean loss of foreign currency, while
confiscation of gear and a catch is a much heavier penalty than the
individual fine may be, although the one may be borne by the state
while the other must be borne by the individual skipper. The loss of
fish quotas is also a value in currency as well as in loss of that
portion of food supply. Foreign fleets are in Canadian waters to
make money and will not prejudice this by violations, as evidenced
by the importance that countries such as the Soviet Union put on
their representative in Halifax.
Also, as experience is gained and techniques of information
compilation are improved, there is an increasing fisheries
intelligence capability. This is provided not only by surveillance of
117. Agreement relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between
Greenland and Canada, done between Denmark and Canada, Ottawa, December
17, 1973
118, Negotiations between Canada and the United States with respect to George's
Bank. Halifax Mail-Star, October 21, 1977
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the fishing vessels and their reports, but by the greatly increased
scientific knowledge of the fish. This provides a greater ability to
assess the state and movement of the fish stocks and what any
individual fishing vessel, operating in a known area with known
gear is actually taking. The FLASH system and computer feed
enables quick verification of aircraft surveillance sighting reports
and spotting of violations. While this is still susceptible to breaks in
surveillance in bad weather or fog, after one or two days of
reasonable surveillance for verification and up-date, the system and
plot are up-dated again. Even in the interim, the computer feed
input will provide a reasonably accurate picture of the known
movements. Violations and the consequential penalties are therefore
just not worth deliberate breach of the regulations.
Prosecutions will remain the prerogative of Canada as the coastal
state, with the further follow-up of supplementary action between
Canada and the flag state. There is therefore no necessity to depend
on the flag state for any action, although such action is likely to be
taken by flag states themselves to regulate their own fleets and
protect their licences. Port state jurisdiction is not likely to be
involved except in areas of joint or regional fisheries management.
Such areas would be ones of joint management such as George's
Bank, and the outer areas of the Continental Shelf beyond the 200
mile limit. In such cases, the treaty evolved will specify some form
of mutual enforcement authority so that either coastal state or port
state jurisdiction could apply. However, in the case of multi-
national regional management, there may still be considerable
opposition to any large extension of coastal state jurisdiction for
prosecution, and therefore violations on the outer continental shelf
beyond the 200 mile limit may still remain a flag-state prerogative.
Future of Environmental Protection
The port r6gime for enforcement of safety standards is effective for
improving the standards of ships calling at Canadian ports. Similarly,
the Vessel Traffic Management Systems are also effective for
increasing the safety of ships entering and leaving Canadian ports
where such systems are in effect. Beyond the 12 mile limit the
jurisdiction is, however, inadequate in respect to both standards and
pollution prevention and in respect to enforcement of the existing
international standards. The inadequacy of enforcement has also
been illustrated by the low proportion of prosecutions and the low
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penalties often awarded in successful cases. Considering the large
amount of transit shipping which passes through the Canadian EEZ,
particularly off the east coast forming the majority of trans-Atlantic
shipping between the northeastern seaboard of the United States and
northwest Europe, this is inadequate to meet Canadian environmen-
tal protection requirements. However, given an extended jurisdic-
tion with degrees of Direct, Advisory and Interventionary Control,
with the present level of surveillance and enforcement capability, it
becomes a question of priority and the degree to which the
capability can be employed for enforcement of the controls and
anti-pollution measures.
To control all shipping in the EEZ is out of the question, and
contrary to the doctrine of innocent passage, but the necessary
enforcement in respect to violations of regulations, be they by
international convention or by coastal state legislation, is essential.
Thus, in the event of violation it is not sufficient to take the
evidence available by report and possibly photographs for
transmission to the flag state for action. The standard demanded
under the Canada Shipping Act and the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act, of absolute liability of the shipowner and, if
necessary, the cargo owner must be extended to the EEZ. In
addition to such liability there are increasing demands for funds to
prbvide for damages which cannot be recovered by direct liability of
the owners. Potential polluters would be required to pay into such a
fund which will inevitably increase the costs of oil transportation,
one forecast being 20% resulting in an increased cost of petrol of 1/2
cent per gallon, 119 but the moves of coastal states towards such
measures are further steps in the extension of coastal state
jurisdiction and establishment of responsibility for pollution. This is
already established in Canada 120 in the Maritime Pollution Claims
Fund to which an amount not exceeding fifteen cents per ton of oil is
payable for oil shipped into and out of Canada in bulk by ship.
12'
However, if the standards are to be maintained at high levels, the
penalties must be commensurate to provide an adequate deterrent.
While few of the actual offenders may be detected and prosecuted,
those that are successfully prosecuted must be awarded penalties
which are heavy enough to bring home the consequences of
violations to all potential polluters. In respect to ships on passage
119. [197713LMCLQ434
120. Canada Shipping Act, S.C. 1971, c.27, s.737
121. Id. at s.748
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through the EEZ, the lack of coastal state jurisdiction, or in fact
ability, to arrest offenders further off-shore may be offset by Port
State jurisdiction.
Port State Jurisdiction
Port state jurisdiction would be authorized under the ICNT
122
providing authority for investigation or prosecution of a vessel
which has committed a violation in the EEZ of another state on
entry into port of a subsequent 'port state". This would be at the
request of the coastal state or the flag state. However, where there is
inadequate coverage by international convention, it is unlikely that
such action would be successful in a tri-lateral action involving the
laws or regulations of different states. The original Canadian
proposal to IMCO in 1972 was not followed through for fear of
diversion from coastal state jurisdiction, but was taken up again in
1973. While the proposal has continued in UNCLOS III, the
authority provided under Article 219 is a watered down version to
carry out investigations on request of a coastal state or flag state but
limited to international rules and standards. This is at least partially
due to a lack of continued action by Canada,' 2 3 but the principle
retains considerable support and, with the possibility of renewed
initiatives through IMCO, could develop as an effective alternative
with less delay and more effective action in respect to violations, 124
but this will depend upon the effectiveness of communications
between states and the administrative and judicial systems of the
port state.
Arrest and Prosecution
The rights of hot pursuit being applicable to the EEZ the prime
requirement for its exercise is that it must be executed by a naval or
government vessel. 125 However, as Canadian enforcement vessels
may be from any one of three or four government departments, does
the right pertain to the ships of any department for any type of
offence? Clearly the action must be authorized, but to the vessel
being arrested, she is a government vessel and thus such authority
may be presumed.
122. ICNT, supra, note 44 at Art. 219
123. M'Gonigle and Zacher, supra, note 61 at 132-33
124. Johnson and Zacher, supra, note 1 at 374
125. Supra, notes 69, 70, 74 and 75
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Having made the arrest, the offender is brought to port either
under her own steam or tow, depending on circumstances and the
amenity of the master and crew to authority. The duration of her
detention for trial and the desirability of her release as soon as
possible must then be considered, providing the requirements of the
case are met. Thus, on the posting of an appropriate bond to cover
the penalty, the ship should be released, although her gear and catch
will presumably be landed. On the other hand, there may be
considerations in rem requiring continued arrest, or there may be
considerations of the prosecution of the master and crew members.
While the case of the ss "Lotus" extended the principle of the state
having title to exercise criminal jurisdiction beyond its territory by
title through sovereignty limited only by prohibitive rules, 126 this
was limited by Article II of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas. If this convention is no longer accepted as immutable in
respect to hot pursuit in the EEZ, there could be a basis for limiting
the provisions of Article 11 to collision cases but permitting a return
to the ss ''Lotus" principle in respect to offences in the EEZ. The
Brussels Convention on the Arrest of Ships127 established the
principle that a ship flying the flag of one of the contracting states
may be arrested in the jurisdiction of any such state in respect of any
maritime claim. In the context of the present world community of
states, the signatories to that convention are now a small minority,
but the principle may now be extended to the broader areas of the
EEZ and, under maritime claims, include pollution claims and
offences. However, two other aspects would preclude prolonged
detention, the implications of arrest of the ship on the whole crew
and the impairment of their liberty and rights, and the aspect of
punishment, usually met by fines, although imprisonment of up to
two years is a maximum penalty.
Intervention by Foreign Naval or Para-military Vessels
Warships are often deployed in the national interest to show the flag
or to otherwise support national interests or policies by their
presence. Distant fishing fleet states such as Japan or the Soviet
Union have never combined such presence with their fishing fleets,
and Japan since her re-emergence as a maritime power has been at
pains to preserve a purely self-defence image for her navy. Even in
126. The s.s. Lotus (1927), P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10 Hudson W.C.R. 23
127, U.S. Publications, A/CN 469
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the Soviet Union's case, however, in which her merchant and
fishing fleets are direct extensions of maritime policy and her navy
has developed into a deep ocean fleet of world capability, her naval
and commercial functions have been kept completely separate.
France, however, with her interests in St. Pierre et Miquelon and
the surrounding fisheries maintains a frigate on station for fisheries
protection. The United States, in her adjacent areas, maintains
Coast Guard cutters on station for fisheries protection as well as
environmental protection and maritime safety.
It is unlikely that such vessels would be deliberately interposed to
defeat Canadian jurisdiction and enforcement action. However,
should an incident develop between the units of two states, it
becomes no longer a matter of sovereign jurisdiction over the
private offender but a matter between the states on a sovereign
basis, as naval or government vessels are representative of their
head of state.1 28 They can only meet as equals and intervention
therefore becomes a matter of diplomatic reference and national
responsibility in which one cannot assert jurisdiction over the other.
On the other hand, where a warship responds to investigate an
apparent attack on, or infringement of the rights of, a vessel of her
own state, she may do so, although in a situation of hot pursuit it is
clearly open to the pursuing vessel to:
a. inform the other government vessel of the situation and
reason, and
b. by her own manoeuvring attempt to prevent interference
while obtaining further instructions from her own authorities.
If she is then ordered to break off, the action is converted into
one of diplomacy.
Should force be used, or threatened, she has the right of
self-defence, to respond to the degree necessary for her defence and
commensurate with the situation. However, in the case of The "Red
Crusader" 129 a British warship successfully interposed herself
between the British trawler and the Danish frigate pursuing her.
As hot pursuit under the present convention l30 as well as under
the INCNT131 can be continued as far as the territorial sea of the
flag state or a third state, such interposition would not have greater
128. C. J. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea (6th ed. London:
Longmans, 1967) at 259-60
129. (1962), 35 I.L.R. 485
130. 1958 Convention on the High Seas at Art. 23
13 1. ICNT, supra, note 44 at Art. IH
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legality in the EEZ of the flag state which in this respect would be
an area of the high seas. However, consideration of the EEZ as a
zone sui generis'32 by the flag state might form a basis providing
the interposition of its own enforcement authority with a cloak of
respectability if not actually authority. Again, co-operation between
neighbouring states would preclude such action, and in the
Canadian situation such action is unlikely to occur, either by the
action of Canadian units or by the units of neighbouring states, even
in consideration of a mirror image situation in which a Canadian
transgressor from an adjacent EEZ might seek to evade pursuit by
protection action of a Canadian fisheries patrol vessel.
VI. The Canadian EEZ as an International Model
Different States and Different Settings
Canada, as a developed state with great technological resources and
expertise, is in a fortunate position even if limited in the extent of
her financial capability to develop the full extent of her resources.
Given the necessary capital, the technology is available so that, as a
geographically advantaged state she has the area and assets with a
growing capability to exploit them on her own terms, by her own
means. Added to this is her geographic situation among
neighbouring developed states with a sufficient commonality of
interests to give a setting in which diplomacy can resolve the
problems of jurisdiction to a large degree and provide a continued
process of co-operation in management of resources. The world
demand for food will keep the fishing nations coming to Canada,
with the need being best met by Canadian management under
coastal state jurisdiction by which participation and jurisdiction
flourish together. Conservation and marine research go hand in
hand, on the basis of pooling of information and joint ventures.
Research in the sea-bed resources is continued by private enterprise,
whether Canadian or foreign corporations, or by government
sponsored activity through Petro-Canada.
Similar considerations apply in many of the developed nations,
and in such areas as the European Economic Community similar
models are developing. On the other hand, some developed states
may feel the effects of regional exclusion of previous interests, as in
the case of the Soviet Union now excluded from areas of the North
Sea, and members of the EEC now excluded from the Barents
132. Id. at Art. 55
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Sea. 133 Even as the principles of the EEZ are being applied, the
resources are being developed and used, and where there are
off-setting assets or mutual interests, co-operation and negotiation
will continue as the means of resolution. Where, however, the
boundaries are clearly defined and national policies require the
reservation of assets under coastal state authority and exploitation,
the principles will prevail and, as the cod wars have shown the
futility of attempts to support the untenable by the unconvinceable,
states are unlikely to attempt or support incursion on the resources
within the EEZ of another state in conflict with its jurisdiction or
management where it is in accordance with the principles of the
EEZ as customary law. In not all areas of developed states is
de-limitation of the EEZ an easy or clear-cut issue and in such areas
co-ordination and diplomacy may be lofty ideals more easily
dispensed with in face to face confrontation or even conflict. The
Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean in the offshore areas of
Turkey, Greece and Cyprus are continuing examples, albeit
quiescent at present. In the Aegean Sea, however, a direct
application of the EEZ on the basis of the Greek islands, or on an
archipelagic principle based on the Greek islands and the waters
they would enclose would clearly be unacceptable to Turkey. With
the history of conflict between those states the prospect of a
Canadian model of diplomacy in resolution of the EEZ may seem an
idealistic dream. On the other hand, given the risks of conflict and
the commonality of interest between those states in the resources of
the sea and the possibilities and advantages of good management in
the areas of contested jurisdiction, the Canadian model has lessons
and advantages of value in application there.
At the further end of the spectrum from the Canadian model is the
possibility of power over a vital interest which a major power may
resolve to exert in support of its own position or claim even though
itself holding to the principles of the EEZ. Certainly the power of a
few countries exeeds anything conceived of a generation ago but,
even holding such power does not make for invincibility in the
community of nations. No world power since 1945 can point to its
arsenal and yet deny defeats, ranging from defeat in armed
conflict' 34 to confrontation,13 5 while in their diplomatic and
133. The Times reports,supra, notes 93 and 94
134. United States in Vietnam.
135. U.S.S.R. during the Cuban blockade.
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economic relations in the world community the very growth of that
community and the emergence of the Third World have predicated
against the retention of interests or assets on a basis of power alone.
The comity of nations is the foundation of international law.
The EEZ in the Third World
The emergence of the Third World challenged previous domination
of the law of the sea by the maritime states, and added maritime
aspects to the North-South struggle. In the wake of renunciation of
the previous principles and conventions favouring the maritime and
technologically-advanced states and support of the principle of the
EEZ by the Group of 77, the only resistance comes from the
disadvantaged states without coastlines, who consequently see
themselves no better off without guarantees of access to the zones of
their neighbours, and the maritime states who accept the principle
but who still resist any threats to the free movement of their
shipping. However, the states of the Third World have a wide
disparity among themselves, through geography or technological
capability. So given that all declare some form of EEZ, the
differences among themselves are unlikely to see uniformity in the
application of the principles of the EEZ. Even where there are
potential resources to develop, the coastal state will be little better
off without the technology or ability to start development,
remaining at the mercy of the developed states or the transnational
corporations.
Some states may therefore be in the position of extending their
jurisdiction but still lacking the benefits. It is to those states that the
developed states such as Canada have an additional responsibility,
of technical assistance and advice, to give the developing states an
investment opportunity in their own resources. A further complica-
tion in the demarcation of resources also lies in the basis on which
many of the Third World frontiers were drawn by their previous
colonial administrations, on a basis of administrative expediency
rather than geography and the characteristics of the land and its
people. Therefore boundaries are much more likely to be disputed,
particularly in regard to assets lying across the seaward extensions
of the old colonial boundaries. The lack of a law of the sea Treaty
and of an established means of resolution of the problems may result
in development of disputes or their resolution on diverging
principles based on expediency or on the imposition of assumed
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influence by a regional power. International law has traditionally
recognized differences in the extent of, or application of principles,
but in the acceptance of the EEZ diversity in the resolution of
problems may suit local conditions but while creating uncertainty in
many areas in which local examples may be used as opposing
criteria. In some areas such as the Persian Gulf one state has
emerged as a local power bent on keeping its own jurisdiction
through a strong self-defence capability and management systems.
Iran has used her own profits to develop a strong navy through
British expertise, and a Marine Management and Coast Guard
harbour and coastal control system with Canadian assistance and
expertise. With her own EEZ in order Iran is in a strong position to
impose a stabilizing influence in her area, in which local disputes
are already being resolved on the principles of the EEZ and median
line principles. 1
3 6
Canada as a recently developed nation with vast areas of
undeveloped assets remaining has faced, and still has, many of the
problems of developing Third World states. She has, however, the
advantages of geography, technology and diplomatic position to
provide a model for other states to follow. In her leadership in
developing the concepts of the EEZ Canada still needs strong
support, particularly among the Third World states to counter-
balance the interests of maritime states and shipping interests, while
at the same time satisfying the geographically disadvantaged and
land-locked states as to the equity of guarantees of access and
resource sharing which will be granted to them. This is even more
important should there be no treaty, in which case the international
sea-bed will yet be taken by the surrounding states, as Arvid Pardo
compared it to the demise of the Republic of Krakow on Poland's
division among her eighteenth-century neighbours. 137 Canada as
one of the geographically advantaged states would also be one with
most to gain from such an encroachment on the International
Sea-bed, but has a responsibility to show that coastal state authority
will be based on equity as well as geographical advantage.
Canada is proving that the management of vast fisheries is
possible by the coastal state for international as well as national
interests. She is showing that diplomacy and co-operative sharing
are a better answer than confrontation over the resources of disputed
areas. Resource sharing and services are a factor of jurisdiction and
136. See supra, note 92
137. See supra, note 87 at411
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assistance. The dangers remain in outmoded concepts of unbridled
free use of seas, and in the creation of mid-ocean vacuums which
are liable to be filled by the more advanced surrounding states to the
detriment of the remainder. Thus based upon principles formulated
by the United States' Supreme Court we are now developing a body
of such conduct resting on the common consent of civilized
communities as affords authoritative evidence of the practice of
states ,138 and which on being established as the usage of nations is
the rule of law.13 9 To balance those two American authorities one
may further support the principle of the EEZ in international law as
"a rule of international law established by its general recognition by
coastal nations (including the chief maritime nations) without it
being necessary to prove in every instance that all states have




Canada has taken a leading role in the development of the doctrine
of the Exclusive Economic Zone through diplomacy and by
unilateral actions. While asserting strong coastal state jurisdiction
for management of resources and the protection of the environment,
Canada has demonstrated that such jurisdiction can be effected by
co-operation for the general benefit of the states concerned, and that
jurisdiction overcoming flag state prerogatives with respect to
shipping in special areas is a means of benefit to users as well as
protection of the environment. There are, however, continuing
problems of the extent of jurisdiction in the EEZ for supervision and
control of shipping, and for measures to prevent pollution beyond
the territorial sea, be it accidental or breach of regulations. With the
doctrine of hot pursuit and the legality of the use of force at the
minimum level commensurate with the situation requiring arrest
extended to the EEZ, Canada has shown that jurisdiction can be a
joint participatory process, more readily accepted when it is clearly
beneficial. Thus, in the future management of the EEZ, there should
be increasing efficiency of management, with enforcement
138. The Scotia (1871), 14 Wall 170 per Strong J. as quoted by Colombos, supra,
note 128 at 10
139. United States v. Perchernan (1833), 7 Peters 51 per Marshall C. J. quoted by
Colombos, id. at 7
140. J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (6th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965) at
62
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concentrating on surveillance and verification. Greater difficulties
exist in the protection of the environment, but a trend to
development of higher international regulations and port state
jurisdiction may off-set the requirement for complete coastal state
jurisdiction. However, arrest and prosecution of offenders will
require heavier penalties and the implementation of Pollution
Claims funds as well as higher liability against the ship-owners and
the cargo owners.
The Canadian model, however, demonstrates:
a. the efficacy of diplomacy in the development of the law and
settlement of disputes;
b. the acceptability of beneficial unilateral action;
c. the efficacy of management and resource sharing for
acceptance of jurisdiction;
d. the success of a strong port r6gime to increase coastal
anti-pollution measures and safety of shipping;
e. the possibility of a stronger coastal state environmental
jurisdiction without undue usurpation of flag state jurisdic-
tion to establish the further minimal extension of controls
necessary; and
f. the efficacy of a supplementary jurisdiction through port
states as a method of enforcement.
Canadian experience and policies of aid to the developing
countries make the Canadian model a useful blueprint for the
developing countries who can also benefit in establishing their
jurisdictional and management systems by assistance from Canada.
However, it also goes towards developing a rdgime which can be
recognized as equitable by the disadvantaged and land-locked
states, who have yet to see any benefit accruing to them from the
acquisitory extensions of jurisdiction.
Whether there is a final Treaty or not, the success of the
development of a new law of the sea will be measured on its
acceptability and the minimal enforcement required, as well as its
equity in the development of the world order. The Canadian model
shows that this is attainable and that the doctrine of the Exclusive
Economic Zone will continue as the keystone of the law of the sea,
whether there is a treaty or not. The Canadian success, however, is
based on diplomacy, management and resource sharing, thus
obtaining other states co-operation and acceptance of Canadian
jurisdiction. The Canadian trump-cards of licenses and quota
allocations reduce enforcement to manageable surveillance and
policing, while the participation of other states in the use of
resources also brings benefits to Canada, The pen may not be
mightier than the sword in all respects, but with proper use of the
pen the sword may be kept sheathed, even though sharp.
